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ABSTRACT
The general equilibrium models in thispaper, with complete markets,
can give the major features of business cycles. Themodels include real
investment, but information is costless and is availableto everyone at
the same time. Fluctuations in the matchbetween resources and wants across
many sectors create major fluctuations in output andunemployment, because
moving resources from one sector to another iscostly. Fluctuations in
thedemand for the services of durablegoods causes much larger fluctuations
in the output of durables, and causesunemployment that takes the form of
temporary layoffs. Since specialized factorscooperate in producing goods
andservices, it makes sense to lay people off ingroups rather than lowering
wages and waiting for them to quit. Similarly, avacancy is created when
a specialized factor is missing from sucha group. Technology comes with
varying levels of risk and expected return associatedwith the degree of
specialization. More specialization means moresevere fluctuations and a
higher average level of unemployment, along witha higher average level of
output and growth. Monetary policy, interestrates, and fiscal policy
have no special roles to play in themodel.
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Business cycles are fluctuations in economic activity. Most measures of
economic activity look something like a random walk with drift: successive
changes in the level of economic activity are largely independent.0 Changes
in the level of economic activity in different sectors are quite highly
correlated, but output of durables fluctuates more than output of
nondurables. Output of durables and unemployment both show some tendency to
return, over time, to normal levels. The normal levels of durables output and
unemployment tend to change, so the path of any measure of economic activity
can be quite complex. We will take unemployment as the variable that best
captures the fluctuations we want to understand.'
General equilibrium models2 take individuals as maximizing the expected
value of a utility function, where utility depends on consumption at various
times of various goods and services, and on state variables that can be taken
to represent tastes.3 We will assume that markets are complete, so we can
show that one does not need incomplete markets to understand the major
features of business cycles: this means that the state variables representing
tastes are observable, and are the basis for some of the traded
securities." We will include physical investment: in fact, we will assume
that a variety of technologies are available at any time. The available
technologies also depend on state variables. Individuals bear costs in
shifting their human capital from one sector to another, and in shifting
physical capital from one sector to another. These adjustment costs seem
largely internal: I do not believe that significant externalities in this
process have been clearly identified.5
Thus the models in this paper are entirely consistent with maximizing behavior
on the part of individuals and firms in light of the information they have and
the opportunities they face.6 It hardly makes sense, in my view, to work—2—
with models thatdonot assume maximizing behavior. At the same time, there
is no easy way to test these models or to estimate the constants ina
model.7 The models I discuss are very incomplete, and it is alwaysvery
difficult to Use observations of economic data to help us understand the
economy. Since we do not know the true model, correlation implies almost
nothing about causation.—3—
A MULTISECTOR MODEL
It is possible to model business cycles using a model with a single good and a
single composite production sector.8 Fluctuations in economic activity in a
model like this appear as fluctuations in the stock of capital.9 Such a
model, however, does not lend itself to an analysis of unemployment. To have
unemployment in a model with maximizing behavior, we need a multisector
model. 10
Both human and physical capital will be specialized, because specialization
increases expected productivity. However, there are shocks to both tastes and
technology in the form of unexpected shifts in the state variables in the
economy. As a result, we find ourselves with a capital stock whose
composition is different from the composition we would have chosen had we
known in advance what the world would be like, The match between resources
and wants is not perfect.
We will want to shift capital from the sectors where we have too much to the
sectors where we have too little. Relative prices will motivate this shift.
But the less advance notice we have, the mOre costly it is to shift capital
between sectors.11 Also, the more different the sectors are from one
another, the more costly it is to shift capital from one to the other.
Shocks that create a poor match, which will mean large shifts of human capital
between sectors, cause unemployment and a decline in output. Shocks that
create a good match will bring unemployment below its average level and output
above its average level. As resources are shifted between sectors, the match
will improve. The shocks combined with the shift of resources will cause
unemployment to wander around its average level: when it is near its average
level, its movements will be largely random; but when it is far from its
average level, the random movements will be combined with a drift back toward
its average level. Of course, the average level will also be changing through
time as tastes and technology change.
Shifting resources between sectors is just one source of unemployment. Other
sources will have somewhat different behavior. Also, a shift of resources can—4--
occur without unemployment. Job changes can occur without an Intervening
period of search or waiting for a new job. This model suggests, though, that
job turnover associated with a change from one employer to another will be
higher in bad times than in good times.
The more sectors there are, the more ways there are for the match to go
wrong. A model that has only consumption goods and investment goods will not
be able to generate much unemployment through this device. A model with a
single good will not produce any of this kind of unemployment at all.
Similarly, no one source of uncertainty, such as uncertainty about relative
prices associated with price level uncertainty, will generate much
unemployment in this model. It is the large number of partly independent
shocka to different sectors that getierates sinifica1t unemployment.
Unemployment generated this way will show considerable persistence, because it
costs less to move resources between sectors slowly than to move them
quickly. A mismatch between resources and wants will be corrected at a rate
that balances the benefits of a better match against the costs of a faster
movement of resources.
The government can reduce the unemployment rate by subsidizing declining
sectors and taxing rising sectors, or by ordering the goods and services
produced in the declining sectors. This will improve welfare only if one
person's unemployment imposes unavoidable costs on others. The case for the
existence of this kind of externality has not been made, In my view.12
To make this model more concrete, let's use a simple example with just two
sectors. Imagine that all individuals are identical, and the world lastsfor
only one period. At the start of the period, an individual chooses amounts
x and y of resources 1 and 2 from a constant elasticity of
transformation production frontier:'3
(I) I =(xb/c+ yb/d)1/b b >1
c>0
d >0—5—
Theindividual chooses x and y knowing thathisutility function Will be
Cobb—Douglas, of the form
(2) =
butwithout knowing the exact value of a
At the end of the period, the individual learns the value of a,andhas a
chance to transform x into y or y into x •Theterms on which the
transformation can be made take the form of another constant elasticity of
transformation production frontier that is tangent to the first frontier at
the polar x ,y•Thesecond frontier is inside the first front.or becauce
last—minute changes are more costly than changes made in advance.
(3) 1 =(xb*Ic*yb*Jd*)1/b* >b
c>0
d*>0
Thefinal amounts chosen, x and y* ,aredetermined by the point
at which the new production frontier (3) is tangent to the indifference curves
(2). It turns out that this point can be denied analytically with no




Thenthe values of x and y* are determined by:—6--
* (7) xIc a•
(8) *b*/d* 1 —a
* *
Aperfect match occurs when x is equal to x and y is equal to
y •Inthat case, it would not have helped to know a in advance. That
represents the maximum possible utility for the individual. The worse the
match, the lower the individual's utility will be.—7—
A DURABLE GOODS MODEL
In addition to the process involving a match between resources and wants
across sectors, there is a process operating within any sector that produces
durable goods. This process helps explain both temporary layoffs and the
exact form that the business cycle takes."
Suppose that demand falls for the services of durable goods produced by a
given sector. Since the stock of durable goods deteriorates slowly, output of
these goods will fall sharply until the stock of goods comes more into line
with demand, given the cost of producing new goods. The decline in output
will be associated with a fall in the relative price of these goods.15
As the stock of durables comes into line, output will gratually nsa, unless
changed by a new shock to tastes or technology. Thus durables will introduce
a pattern of a sharp fall in output followed by a gradual rise, or a sharp
rise in output followed by a gradual fall. These patterns will be added to a
pattern of random changes due to new shocks, so they will not be seen in pure
form.
Output of durables will respond more to new information than output of
nondurables. Thus sectors producing durables should show larger cyclical
fluctuations than sectors producing nondurables.
Moreover, some of the changes in output in a durable goods sector will be
temporary. A temporary decline in output will be associated with temporary
layoffs. Thus the behavior of durable goods helps us understand another
component of unemployment.'6
Again, let's make the discussion more concrete by working out a simple
example. Assume that the loss of utility from having the wrong stock of
durables is proportional to the square of the difference between the actual
stock x and the target stock k ,andhas weight 2 •Assumethat the
loss of utility associated with adjusting the stock of durables is
proportional to the square of the rate of adjustment ,t. Assumethat we can
ignore discounting. Finally, assume that output y is for replacement of—8--
depreciated capital at rate qx plus adjustment of the stock of capital at
0 ratex.
Assume all individuals are identical, and want to minimize the total loss of
utility over an Infinite lifetime associated with a shock that moves k away
*
fromthe initial value x of the stock x of durables.
(9) Minimize: [g2(x—k)2 + ;2ldt
The individual chooses a path for x that minimizes the value of this




(12) y qx —g(x*—
Wecan see that a sudden change in k will cause a sudden change in y
followed by a gradual change in y in the opposite direction.—9—
UNEMPLOYMENT
Unemployment, inthe models outlined above, takes two forms. One form is
associated with costlyshifts of human capital between sectors when there is a
poormatch between resources and wants. The other is associated with
temporary layoffs when times are bad in durable goods sectors. These two
kinds of unemployment will tend to rise and fall together, though they will
not always be perfectly in phase. Output will tend to fall when unemployment
rises, and to rise when unemployment falls. Unemployment will be
countercyclical; or if we use unemployment to define the business cycle, we
can say that output is procyclical.'7
So far, the models have nothing to say about why firms fire or lay off their
employees in bad times rather than lowerin8 wages £0 that the desircd number
will quit. Some of the reasons are obvious. An employee who quits will not
generally be eligible for unemployment benefits under current law, so the
employee and employer may agree to make it an involuntary terininat ion. An
employee who has been notified through a wage reduction that it's time to
think about leaving may not be very productive: he may even do things that
harm his employer.
More generally, though, I think the reason lies in the fact that production
involves the cooperation of a number of people with specialized skills. A
firm cares about more than just the number of employees. When a few key
employees leave, the others may become much less productive. Thus it is
natural to close down a whole unit at once, and to lay off or transfer
essentially all the employees of that unit.
The cooperative production notion may also help us understand vacancies. When
a key person has left a unit that is being kept open, or when a key person is
missing from a unit being reopened, it can be important to find that person
quickly. A firm will use advertising or hiring bonuses to do it. It will not
use high wages for that person unless a person with the desired skills will
receive high wages anywhere he works.
Can the models outlined above help us understanci why workers with less— 10—
seniorityare generally laid off first, or why young people have.a relatively
high unemployment rate? I think so. Young people have more time to recoup
the costs of changing sectors, so they will favor an arrangement that gives
them higher pay than they would otherwise get in exchange for the risk of
being laid off first in a downturn. A worker with less seniority has fewer
skills specific to the job, so a relatively small decline in the sector the
worker is in will make other jobs more attractive.
These models do imply that in a downturn, the rate at which workers move from
oue sector to another will rise. This may be hard to see at first, since
people who are laid off may not know yet whether they will be changing sectors
or not. The number of quits may fall in a downturn, because of a reduction in
the number of vacancies (as defined above) and because people who would
otherwise quit may now be laid off. This will be especially true in sectors
producing durable goods.
Since we are assuming that markets are complete, long ten contracts do not
play any special role.'° It is not restrictive to have long term contracts
available along with shorter ten contracts.
-— 11—
CHOICEAMONG TECHNOLOGIES
In the models outlined above, we discussed the choice amongtechnologies only
invery general terms. An individual could choose a point along a production
frontier that put resources into each of two sectors. Sectors, however, can
be defined in many ways. A more specialized worker and a less specialized
worker can be taken as being in different sectors, even though they
participatein productionprocesses with the same outputs.
Specialization is associated with both risk and productivity. When certain
factors affecting tastes and technology are uncertain, there is a risk that a
specialized factor will not be wanted. On the other hand, if it is wanted,
theproductivity of a specializedfactor will generally be higher thaitthe
productivityof a nonspecialized factx.r doing the same job. In other words,
greater specialization means that whenthe match between resources and wants
isgood, output will be very high, but when thematch is bad, output will be
very low. It is very costly to move a specialized factor from one kind of
taskto another.
Note that the risks in theuse of specialized resources do not cancel. High
demand in one sector does not offset low demand in another, since it is costly
to shift resources from the low demand sector to the high demand sector. When
the match is poor, output will be low and unemployment will be high.
Individuals will choose investments in humanandphysical capital that reflect
theirpreferences. The more tolerant of risk they are, and the more tolerant
ofunemployment they are, the more specialized the chosen resources will be.
Higherrisk and higher unemployment will be associated with higher expected
outputand growth.
Notethat if marketsare incomplete, people will be less able to exchange
risks, so they will choose less specialization, less severe business cycles,
loweroutput, and lower growth. Similarly, if people have less Information, a
givendegree of specialization willberiskier, so they will cut back both
riskand expected productivity.— 12—
Notealso that the magnitude of fluctuations In output and unemployment tells
us very little about welfare. Since large fluctuations are associated with
rapid growth, there is no index of welfare that takes Into account only the
magnitude of fluctuations. The government can dampen fluctuations by taxing
risk or by taxing specialization in any of several ways, but this seems more
likely to reduce welfare than to increase it, because it Introduces
unnecessary distortions.— 13—
OTHERM&TTF.RS
In a model with complete markets, inflation will play no role at all.In the
real world, inflation is associated with certain costs, such as the cost of
changing prices, the cost of contracting in real terms, and the cost of
economizing on the use of currency. With one exception, these costs seem
small compared to the cost of a mismatch between resources and wants.
The exception is that when inflation turns to large deflation and the nominal
riskless short term interest rate falls to zero, we have a "currency trap."
The real interest rate is forced to be higher than it would be in the absence
of currency. This can cause major dislocations, and I believe it wasone
reason for the severity of the great depression.
I believe that monetary policy is not a cause of variations in the rate of
inflation.'9 Even if it does influence inflation, though, it will not have
s significant influence on business cycles under the models outlined above.
SImilarly, fiscal policy can affect the business cycle in ways discussed
above. The government can subsidize declining ectors or buy theiroutput.
It can tax specialization or risk—taking. It will thereby reduce the
magnitude of fluctuations and the average level of unemployment, but will
probably reduce welfare at the same time because it. will distort investment
choice. Similarly it can subsidize unemployment by paying generous
unemployment benefits.2° Assuming that these activities are limited, fiscal
policy will not play a significant role either increasing or decreasing the
magnitude of business cycles.— 14—
FOOTNOTES
*Iam grateful for comments on earlier drafts by many people, including
those who don't agree with me. A less formal description of this model
appears in Black (1981).
t Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
0Nelsonand Plosser (1981) discuss the random walk nature of macroeconomic
time series.
This characterization of business cycles is close to Arrowts (1978, p.
160). For more extensive characterIzations nf bustness cycles that are
consistent with general equilibrium models, see Lucas (1977, p. 9), Kydland
and Prescott (1978, pp. 1—2), and Hodrick and Prescott (1981).
2Foranalyses of genberal equilibrium models, see Arrow (1971), Debreu
(1959), and Hirshleifer (1970).
The utility functions used in general equilibrium models are often assumed
to be state—independent. For example, Diamond (1967) uses a
state—independent utility function. He notes (p. 761, n. 6) that this is a
restrictive assumption. Hirshleifer (1970, p. 220) uses a "uniqueness"
axiom to rule out state dependent utility functions. Phelps (1962, 1967,
p. 141) uses a utility function that is independent of both time and state.
On the other hand, Fama (1970) and Feiger (1976) use models with
state—dependent utility functions. The original von Neumann—Morgenstern
(1953) axioms ensure the existence of utility functions defined over both
states and consumption streams, but Marshak (1950, p 113) eliminates the
state dependence in his version of the existence theorem. Lucas (1977,
pp. 20, 25) includes changing tastes as part of his theory of business
cycles. Krelle (1973, esp. pp. 105—106 and pp. 115—116) discusses several
ways in which tastes change, involving the influence of past consumption of
a good on its present and future utility. Vickrey (1964, pp. 23—24)
describes, without bringing them into his later theories, various kinds of— 15—
changesin tastes that may be important in the behavior of an economy. He
mentions in particular the conscious development of tastes, either by the
individual himself or by others.
" Theuse of state—dependent utility functions does not imply that taste
changes are being used as a catch—all explanation for anything that cannot
otherwise be explained since tastes are taken to be observable. I will
assume that the utility function itself is constant: at that level, tastes
are constant too. Stigler (1966, p. 39) argues that it is best to treat
tastes as fixed at a lower level: that it is best to use a state—dependent
utility function, in effect. Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 76) say: "The
establishment of the proposition that one may usefully treat tastes as
stable over time and similar among people is the central task of this
essay." But Ir. the examples they give, it is more the highest level utility
function that is constant. They redefine commodities in a way that
effectively indexes them by the state of the world. The use of
state—Indexed commodities as arguments in the utility function is equivalent
to the use of a state dependent utility function. Pollack (1978, p. 375)
notes that Stigler and Becker should be objecting to the use of
unobservables, whether of tastes or technology, rather than to the use of
taste differences and taste change.
The use of adjustment costs in production functions has been formalized by
Lucas (1967), Uzawa (1969), and Jorgenson (1972). The idea that there are
adjustment costs in shifting labor from one sector to another has been
developed by Herberg (1972). This model has been extended to allow for
finite adjustment costs for both labor and capital by Herberg and Kemp
(1972).
6 Lucas (1975,pp. 1113—1114) gives a compelling argument for using models
based on maximizing behavior. The trouble with models containing
disequilibrium or arbitrary elements is that they are as unstable as the
economy itself is. The arbitrary elements surely change, but the ways in
which they change are not specified in the model. And it is usually true
that if all economic agents come to have a full understanding of a
disequilibrium model, the model will no longer describe the world— 16—
correctly.Models based on the work of Keynes (1936, 1965) have such
disequilibrium elements as an interest rate that differs from the marginal
product of capital, or a wage that is not free to move. Models based onthe
work of Lucas (1975) depend on easily cured ignorance about the current
state of the world and on inability to create simple securities.
The difficulties with the use of econometrics in trying to discover the
structure of the economy are discussed by Black (1982), Pratt and Schlaifer
(1982), and Learner (1982).
8 Merton's (1973) intertemporal capital pricing model can be used as a model
of business cycles, though he doesn't suggest such a use.
Kydland and Prescott (1978, pp. 3—4) argue plausibly that we can
characterize the elements responsible for the persistence of business cycles
as "capital—like elements." Their discussion (p. 1) of business cycleshas
at least two other features in common with the model in this paper: the
notion that taste changes are important, and the notion that the effects of
certain kinds of shocks cannot be diversified away.
'°Lucas and Prescott (1974, p. 190) set upa multisector model of
unemployment with stochastic demand In each market. They imposeconstraints
on the model that keep it from being a model of business cycles. Hayek
(1939) Includes as part of his theory the notion that specialization of
labor in the presence of uncertainty is one cause of fluctuations in
employment. Kydland (1980) has a real business cycle model in which costs
of adjustment between sectors are important.
''Alchian (1959) discusses the relation between production cost and such
factors as the amount of time available for planning the production run.
'2Diamond (1981) discusses some possible external effects of this kind.
'3Powell and Gruen (1968) discuss this kind of production frontier.
"The role played by intermediate goods in Long and Plosser (1982) is—17—
similar to the role played in this model by durable goods. Kydland and
Prescott's (1981) "time to build" also involves the effects of durable
goods. Sargent (1979, pp. 160—170) has an equilibrium theoiy of layoffs in
which "sticky" wages play a role.
15This kind of argument is standard in acceleratormodels. For a
traditional discussion of the accelerator in businesscycle theory, see
Hicks (1946, esp. 299—302). Lucas (1977,p. 23) has a more modern
description. Durable goods also play an important role inKydland and
Prescott's (1980) "competitive theory of fluctuations."
"In particular, it is notnecessary to assume non—separable utility. Barro
and King (1982) discuss the differences between models withseparable and
non—separable utility. Durable goods play an important role in their
models, too.
'71n Long and Plosser (1982),unemployment will tend to rise when output
rises if producers switch inputs more easily than consumers switch between
consumption of the coimnodity and consumption of leisure.
"For models in which long termcontracts do play a special role, see
Burdett and Mortensen (1980).
"For an introduction tomy views on monetary policy, see Black (1972). For
an alternate view of monetary policy in a real business cyclemodel, see
King and Plosser (1982).
20Benjamin and Kochin (1979, p. 476) state: "We have shown thatthe
persistently high rate of unemployment in interwar Britain was due inlarge
part not to deficient aggregate demand but to high unemployment benefits
relative to wages."— 18—
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